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RULE-MAKING AND ADJUDICATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICY MAKING: NLRB v. WYMAN-GORDON CO.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been the target
of criticism because of the manner in which the Board makes rules and
formulates new policies.' The National Labor Relations Act empowers
the Board "to make . . . , in the manner prescribed by the Admini-
trative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 2 The Administrative
Procedure Act' (APA) provides the Board with two methods of devising
rules and orders, quasi-legislative rule-making and ad hoc adjudication.
The rule-making procedure is designed for the promulgation of rules
of general or particular applicability and future effect.' It requires
that an agency (1) publish general notice of the proposed rule-making
in the Federal Register ; 5 (2) give interested persons the opportunity
to participate in the rule-making process through submission of writ-
ten data and arguments; and (3) incorporate into the rule a concise
statement of its basis and purpose, publishing the rule not less than
thirty days before its effective date.' The adjudicative procedure is
applicable when an agency intends to issue an order,' i.e., "the whole
or part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than
rule-making . . . ."" This procedure requires an adversary proceeding
complete with notice of the issues, responsive pleading, hearing and
decision.° The NLRB has never utilized, however, the Act's rule-making
procedures, but has established rules of general applicability and future
effect through the process of ad hoc adjudication!'
Until recently, courts have only criticized the Board as unwise
in promulgating rules by this method, while upholding its right to do
so." In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,' 2 however, the Supreme Court
1 See Peck, Critique of NLRB Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication
and Rule-Making, 117 Pa. L. Rev. 254 (1968); Shapiro, The Choice of Rule-Making
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Procedure, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921
(1965). For a critical analysis of the Board's failure to utilize the rule-making procedures
contained in the Administrative Procedure Act when devising general rules of future
effect, see Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 Yale L.J. 729 (1961). For a strong criticism, see Summers, Politics, Policy-
Making, and the NLRB, 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 93, 105-07 (1955).
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
3 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-76 (1967).
4 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(4) (1967).
5 "unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or other-
wise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (1967).
6 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c), (d) (1967).
7 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(7) (1967).
B 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(6) (1967).
9 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1967).
to Sec, e.g., American Potash and Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954); Peerless
Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
11 NLRB v. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Dist. Lodge No. 15, I.A.M. v. NLRB, 389 U.S. 843 (1967); NLRB v. Majestic
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challenged this method and held invalid the procedure utilized in
Excelsior Underwear, Inc.," where the Board in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding announced a rule requiring an employer, once the Board directs
that a representation election be held, to provide the Regional Director
of the NLRB with a list of the names and addresses of all employees
eligible to vote in the election. The unions competing in the election
may then obtain the list from the Regional Director. The rule was
made prospective, to take effect thirty days from the date of the order,
and was not applied to the parties in Excelsior. In Wyman-Gordon,
the Court stated that the procedures employed in Excelsior were inap-
propriate for the establishment of a rule of general applicability and
future effect, and therefore, the rule established therein was invalid.
This is the first time the Court has refused to uphold a Board rule
on the ground that it was formulated by the improper procedure.
It is the purpose of this comment to determine the effect of Wyman-
Gordon on the discretion of administrative agencies to employ adju-
dicative as opposed to rule-making procedures. It is concluded that
Wyman-Gordon only minimally restricted agency discretion by holding
that once an agency decides to issue a rule of general applicability
and future effect, it must utilize the rule-making procedures of the
APA. It may not establish such rules in the course of adjudication.
If the agency does not feel the need for a rule, it may proceed by
ad hoc adjudication. The Court has, in effect, insisted that the NLRB
keep clearly in mind the distinction between rule-making and adjudica-
tion, while in no way restricting the Board's ability to retain flexibility
in policy making by the use of adjudication.
I. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.
On the petition of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board for the
First Region issued on September 6, 1966, a "Decision and Direction
of Election" ordering, pursuant to Section 9 of the National Labor
Relations Act,' an election among the production and maintenance
employees of the Wyman-Gordon Company at its plants in Worcester,
North Grafton, and Millbury, Massachusetts. The employees were to
choose whether they desired to be represented for collective bargaining
purposes by the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship-
builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, or by the United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or by neither. The Board ordered
the Company to file with the Regional Director, within seven days
of the order of the election, a list of the names and addresses of its
employees eligible to vote for use by the unions. The Board based
Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d
899 (2d Cir. 1963).
12 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
13 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
14 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
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its order requiring this list on the rule laid down in Excelsior." The
Company refused to comply with the order and the representation
election was held without the list being filed. Both unions were de-
feated in the election. The Boilermakers filed objections to the election
based on the Company's failure to provide the list. The Regional Direc-
tor upheld these objections, set aside the election, ordered a second
balloting, and again directed the Company to comply with the require-
ment. When the Company again refused to provide the list, the Board
issued a subpoena ordering it to file the list or produce its personnel and
payroll records showing its employees' names and addresses." The
Board filed an action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts seeking to have its subpoena enforced or to have
a mandatory injunction issued compelling the Company to comply with
its order.17 The district court directed enforcement of the Board's
15 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). The Excelsior rule was prompted when two unions
which were both defeated in a representation election contested the validity of the
election on the ground, inter cilia, that the employer's refusal to furnish a list of the
names and addresses of those employees eligible to vote deprived the unions of an ade-
quate opportunity to counter the campaign literature circulated by the employer. While
the Board in Excelsior did certify the results of that election, it announced in its decision
that in all future elections refusal to provide this list would constitute grounds for
setting aside the election.
16 Section 11(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964))
states:
The Board . . . shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated
or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in ques-
tion. The Board ... shall upon application of any party to such proceedings,
forthwith issue to such party subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceeding or investiga-
tion requested in such application.
17 Section 11(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964))
states:
In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any
district court . . . upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue
to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Board, .. .
there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the
matter under investigation or in question . .
The Wyman-Gordon Company contended in the present case that a representation election
was not an "investigation" within the meaning of the statute, and that the names and
addresses subpoenaed did not constitute "evidence" since they would be used for election-
eering purposes and not to prove or disprove a fact in issue. 394 U.S. at 768-69. In
Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945), the Supreme Court stated regard-
ing representation proceedings, "[a] direction of election is but an intermediate step
in the investigation, with certification as the final and effective action." Id, at 707. As
for the Wyman-Gordon Company's contention that the list was not "evidence" according
to accepted definitions of the term, the district court answered:
Standard definitions of "evidence" . . . are not very helpful because the "some-
thing" at issue in this case is a group preference rather than a demonstrable fact.
Also, the Board's function here is far different from that of the traditional,
passive fact finder. The Board is conducting an active representation investiga-
tion in which the regulation of an election is an integral part. . fIln the con-
text of § 11 of the Act, "evidence" means not only proof at a hearing but also
books and records and other papers which will be of assistance to the Board
in conducting a particular investigation. 270 F. Supp. 280, 284-85 (D. Mass. 1967).
66
RULE-MAKING vs. ADJUDICATION
order.' In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that the order to the Company to provide the names
and addresses was invalid because it was based on the rule announced
in Excelsior," a rule which had not been formulated in accordance
with the rule-making requirements of the APA." The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits on this issue . 2i
Following the grant of certiorari several courts of appeal upheld the
procedure used in Excelsior."
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit that the rule announced by the Board in Excelsior was
invalid because it was not adopted in compliance with the rule-making
provisions of the APA, but held, nevertheless, that the Board's specific
direction to the Wyman-Gordon Company to provide a list of names
and addresses of employees eligible to vote in the representation elec-
tion was valid " [b] ecause the Board in an adjudicatory proceeding
directed the respondent itself to furnish the list . . . ."" The Court
pointed out that the Board, in Excelsior, purported to establish a rule
of general applicability and future effect, and that in precisely such
circumstances the APA sets out specific provisions governing the mak-
ing of such agency rules. The Court noted that the purpose of the rule-
making provisions of the APA is "to assure fairness and mature con-
sideration of rules of general application," 24
 and that these procedures
"may not be avoided by the process of making rules in the course of
adjudicatory proceedings.""
In support of this conclusion the Court observed that the notice
of hearing required by the APA to be published in the Federal Register
must be "general in character," that the terms or substance of the rule
The Supreme Court upheld the district court on this point. 394 U.S. at 768-69. See also,
NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 384- F.2d 188, 191-92 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
959 (1968); British Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52, 55-58 (7th Cir. 1967). It is suggested here that once
the district court decided that the matter under investigation was "group preference,"
it would have been reasonable to hold that the list was "evidence" tending to prove
or disprove whether the employees desired union representation. "Evidence" could then
have been used in its traditional sense.
18 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967).
19 397 F.2d 394, 397 (1st Cir. 1968).
20 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552, 553 (1967). In so holding, the court of appeals concluded
that the Excelsior rule was a "substantive" requirement and not "procedural," and,
therefore, not exempt from the APA rule-making requirements. 397 F.2d at 397-98. The
APA specifically exempts "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice," from the
requirements of advance notice and public participation applicable to substantive rule-
making. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(3)(A) (1967).
21 Howell Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Hanes
Hosiery Div., 384 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52 (7th Cir.
1967).
22
 NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Beech-
Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968); British Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB,
405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1968).
23 394 U.S. at 766.
24 Id. at 764.
25 Id,
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must be stated in the notice, and that all interested parties must have
an opportunity to participate in the rule-making." The Court stated
that the adjudicatory procedure used by the Board in Excelsior failed
to meet these requirements." Although the Court gave some weight to
the fact that the rule formulated in Excelsior was not applied to the
parties in that proceeding, it indicated that adjudicated cases wherein
new policies are applied to the parties may serve as precedents, i.e.,
"a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in future
cases," but "this is far from saying . . . that commands, decisions, or
policies announced in adjudication are 'rules' in the sense that they
must, without more, be obeyed by the affected public."" Thus, an order
in an adjudicated case may be specifically applied only to the parties
to that proceeding. Insofar as the Board is exercising its quasi-legis-
lative power by formulating a policy of general applicability and future
effect,, however, even though doing so as an incident of a valid adjudi-
cation, it must follow the rule-making procedures. Thus, because the
direction to Wyman-Gordon to submit a list of the names and addresses
of its employees was incorporated in a specific order, the Company was
required to obey it regardless of the fact that the direction was ex-
plicitly based on the Excelsior rule. The disclosure requirement was said
to be a legitimate exercise of the Board's broad discretion to insure
the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives." The Court,
therefore, supported the policy underlying the disclosure requirement,
noting that the objections to it were clearly and correctly answered
by the Board in its Excelsior decision.34
Initially, Wyman-Gordon seems to place severe restrictions on
the discretion of the NLRB to decide whether it should promulgate
rules by the rule-making procedure, or by adjudication. The failure
of the Court to remand, however, even though the Board based its
order on the discredited Excelsior rule, suggests the possibility that
20 Id. at 764-65. Instead of giving all interested parties the opportunity to participate
in the policy making, the Board invited certain groups to submit briefs in the Excelsior case.
Considering the value of such amicus curiae briefs as opposed to those opinions which
may have been generated were the rule-making procedure followed, Peck wrote:
rut is doubtful that an amicus brief, the arguments of which have been oriented
to the problems presented in the factual context of a particular case, could ap-
proach in value the critical analysis which might have been given to a set of
rules . . . which would have been proposed by the NLRB if it had complied
with the Administrative Procedure Act.... Moreover the experience and vantage
point of private parties might have enabled them to point out defects in the
detail of the proposed rules, or unforeseen or undesirable consequences likely to
result from them. . . . In addition, parties filing amicus curiae briefs may well
feel themselves restricted to the record compiled by others and thus refrain from
introducing additional data bearing on the question.
Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, supra
note 1, at 756-57.
27 394 U.S. at 764.
28 Id. at 765-66.




the Board can enforce rules improperly promulgated in adjudicatory
proceedings, and thus, as a practical matter, avoid the newly defined
restrictions. The Court's apparent application of the invalid rule to
the parties makes a determination of the effects of Wyman-Gordon on
the rule-making practices of the Board particularly difficult. Actually,
the decision does not restrict agency discretion by forcing an agency
to employ the rule-making procedures whenever it formulates policies.
It does require utilization of such procedures, however, when the policy
is purportedly a rule. Furthermore, there are practical differences be-
tween precedents set in adjudicated cases and formal rules of general
applicability and future effect, and such differences are likely to prompt
the Board to employ rule-making procedures. 3 '
II. RULE-MAKING VS. ADJUDICATION
The APA does not provide agencies with specific guidelines for
utilizing the rule-making and adjudicatory processes. The Supreme
Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp." concluded that the choice between
proceeding by adjudication or by rule-making "lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency."" In that case, the
Court upheld the Commission's order approving a plan for the re-
organization of a holding company. As part of its order the Commission
required for the first time that preferred stock, purchased by the man-
agement of the company without fraud or concealment while plans of
reorganization were before the Commission, should not be eligible for
conversion into stock of the reorganized company, but should be sur-
rendered at cost plus interest. The Court rejected the contention that
the Commission was precluded from announcing and retroactively ap-
plying a new principle in an adjudicatory proceeding, stating that "any
rigid requirement" dictating the Board's choice of one manner of pro-
mulgation over another "would make the administrative process inflex-
ible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems
which arise. . . . To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion
of the other is to exalt form over necessity." 34
 With the existence of
such broad administrative discretion, the NLRB has consistently uti-
lized the adjudicative procedure, even when it was probably more ap-
propriate to employ the rule-making procedure. In American Potash
31 The projected effects of the name and address requirement on the solicitation and
distribution of campaign material during an NLRB election campaign are beyond the
scope of this comment. For a discussion of this topic generally, see 45 North Caro-
lina L. Rev. 785 (1967); 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1395 (1966); 80 Harv. L. Rev. 459 (1966);
for background on NLRB election campaigns generally, see Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 38 (1964); Drotning, Employer Free Speech: Two Basic Questions
Considered by the NLRB and Courts, 16 Lab. L.J. 131 (1965); Gould, Union Activity
on Company Property, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1964).
82 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
88 Id. at 203. See also, California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 371
(1965); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421 (1942).
84 332 U.S. at 202.
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and Chem. Corp.," for example, the Board admitted adopting, in
a clearly adjudicatory proceeding, a "new rule" regarding future cases
of craft severance. Similarly, in Peerless Plywood Co.," the Board
stated: "[ajccordingly, we now establish an election rule which will be
applied in all election cases. . . . Violation of this rule will cause
the election to be set aside whenever valid objections are filed." 37
in the light of Chenery, the courts have criticized the Board as
unwise because of its repeated failure to promulgate rules of general
applicability and future effect in accordance with the rule-making pro-
visions of the APA, but generally have upheld its right to establish
such rules in adjudicatory proceedings. For example, in NLRB v.
A.P.W. Prods. Co.," although the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit criticized the Board for failing to use rule-making procedures,
it sustained the Board's action in announcing, in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding, a reversal of its prior practice of tolling back pay for the
period between the trial examiner's dismissal of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge and the Board's decision to the contrary. The court stated:
[M]uch can be said . . . in favor of an agency's invoking
the rule-making procedure when it wants to make rules. . .
But our question is not of wisdom but of authority. Congress
can not have been blind to the fact that the adjudicative
process of the agencies, like that of the courts, gives birth to
"rules" which may apply for the past, for the future, or more
generally, for both.. .. The short of it would seem to be that
when an administrative agency makes law as a legislature
would, it must follow the rule-making procedure . and
when it makes law as a court would, it must follow the ad-
judicative procedure . . . ; whether to use one method of
law-making or the other is a question of judgment, not of
power.39
Similarly, in NLRB v. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc.," the court, al-
though disturbed by the Board's continued failure to make use of
APA's rule-making procedures, and stating that it would have been
more administratively proper to conduct a rule-making proceeding,
concluded that, on the facts of the case, they could not hold that the
choice to proceed by adjudication was beyond the Board's power. 4 '
It is not surprising, then, that courts faced with the enforcement
of the Excelsior rule generally approved it. In NLRB v. Beech-Nut
88 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422-23 (1954).
36 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
87 Id. at 429.
38 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
89 Id. at 905.
40 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1967).




Life Savers, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
holding that the Excelsior rule was properly formulated in a valid adju-
dicative proceeding, stated that it was within the discretion of the
Board to decide how to deal with the problems encountered in the
administration of federal labor laws. The court reasoned that, while
the Board might issue general rules in quasi-legislative proceedings, if
the same issue arises before the Board in an adjudicative proceeding,
the Board can resolve it by decision in the case, and this decision might
then give rise to a rule to be applied in the future." The Beech-Nut
court also rejected the contention that the Excelsior rule, because it
was not applied to the parties in the latter case, was not formulated
in a valid adjudicative proceeding, stating that the rule was substan-
tially related to the facts, issues, and arguments of the Excelsior case,
and that it was not a fatal defect that the rule extended beyond those
facts."
The Supreme Court in Wyman-Gordon, however, places a more
stringent limitation on the Board's discretion. The prevailing opinion
stated that the only question to be considered was whether "the Board
purported to make a rule: i.e., to exercise its quasi-legislative power,"45
and that the issue of the validity of the proceeding was not relevant.
Insofar as the Board purports to make a rule, whether or not it applies
the rule to the parties, it must use rule-making procedures. The Court
based its decision on the distinction between rule-making and adjudi-
cation appearing in the APA. The Court also distinguished rule-making
in the sense used in the APA from what is often called a "rule," i.e.,
a precedent. The Court recognized the legitimate use of decided cases,
wherein new policies are applied and announced, as precedents which
serve as "a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take
in future cases."45 Thus, under no circumstances may a rule of general
applicability and future effect be established in an adjudication even
if the requirements for a valid adjudication have been met. Further-
more, the Court implies that new policies may not be established as
precedents unless they are applied to the parties to the proceeding.
The Chenery principle that the choice of proceeding by adjudi-
cation or by rule-making "lies primarily in the informed discretion of
the administrative agency 747
 remains unchanged, although it is clarified
by Wyman-Gordon. The courts have generally interpreted Chenery as
holding that an agency may choose to make a rule by either the rule-
making procedure or the adjudicatory procedure. Wyman-Gordon states
that the agency's choice is whether to make a rule by the rule-making
procedure or to adjudicate the issues between the parties. If adjudica-
tion is selected, the decision may serve only as precedent and may not
42 406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
48 Id. at 257-58.
44 Id. at 258.
45 394 U.S. at 765.
46 Id. at 765-66.
47 332 U.S. at 203.
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be viewed as a rule of general applicability and future effect. Thus,
in cases such as American Potash," Peerless Plywood" and Excelsior
where the Board clearly purported to make such rules, Wyman-Gordon
now requires the Board to follow the rule-making procedures. Con-
versely, the type of "rules" which the courts upheld in A.P.W. Prod-
ucts' and Penn Cork". is limited to the function of precedent in sub-
sequent adjudications, not binding on others except insofar as made
part of specific orders to particular parties.
Wyman-Gordon clearly respects the distinctions appearing in the
APA between rule-making and adjudicatory procedures. The Act on
the one hand establishes a procedure for making rules of general ap-
plicability and future effect. Then it specifically establishes an adjudi-
catory procedure to be used in matters other than rule-making. The
two procedures are clearly distinct and mutually exclusive. The Court
noted that the basic purpose for the distinction is to allow all parties
who might be affected by a new policy an opportunity to present their
views on it before it is adopted. However, since the Excelsior rule, in-
validated in Wyman-Gordon, was clearly of general applicability and
future effect, and yet only the parties to the proceeding and invited
amici curiae had the opportunity to be heard, the Court concluded that
the Board has ignored this distinction. The fact that the rule was only
applied prospectively made its legislative character particularly ap-
parent.
The decision also emphasizes the substantial differences between
judicial and administrative proceedings. The Court noted that the effect
of stare decisis is more limited in agency proceedings." Precedents
arising from agency adjudicatory proceedings are not "rules of law"
in the same sense as court decisions are. Administrative decisions are
guidelines which are far less binding and more easily overruled. The
Beech-Nut court's conclusion that the Board can issue general rules in
both quasi-legislative proceedings and adjudicative proceedings fails
to recognize this distinction.
In effect, the rule-making provisions of the APA enable agencies
to exercise quasi-legislative powers similar to those exercised by the
courts in precedent-setting decisions. As the Supreme Court noted in
Chenery, there is less reason for an agency to issue general rules in an
adjudicatory proceeding than there is for courts in view of the avail-
ability to the agencies of this rule-making procedure." Furthermore,
while the Court suggests that the APA precludes an agency from es-
tablishing precedents through decisions applied only prospectively, no-
thing inherent in the adjudicatory process prevents precedents from
being established in such a manner. Courts have long been upheld in
48 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
4° 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
5° 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir, 1963).
51 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1967).
as 394 U.S. at 766.
53 332 U.S. at 202.
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applying rulings prospectively. 54 But the APA defines administrative
adjudication as "agency process for the formulation of an order.""
This can be interpreted as a statutory limitation on agencies, an ad-
judication being valid only insofar as it results in the issuance of an
order to the parties involved. Henceforth, an agency in the course of
adjudication may decide that a new policy it considers desirable may
not be equitably applied to the parties before it, but if it wishes to make
that policy a rule with future effect it will be necessary to institute
rule-making procedures.
The effect of Wyman-Gordon is ambiguous because the Court en-
forced the Board's order against Wyman-Gordon while holding that
the rule upon which the order was based was invalid. Both the con-
curring and dissenting opinions criticize the prevailing opinion for being
inconsistent and in effect negating the rule-making requirements of
the APA. Justice Black suggests that the Court is, in fact, enforcing the
disclosure requirement "adjudicated" in Excelsior without regard to
whether it was adopted as an incident to the decision of the case, and
enforcing the Excelsior rule regardless of whether it had been adopted
according to rule-making requirements." An examination of the opinion
indicates, however, that the Court did not enforce the disclosure re-
quirement as "adjudicated" in Excelsior. Rather, having invalidated
the Excelsior rule, the Court then had to decide whether to enforce the
specific order issued to the Wyman-Gordon Company. Thus, it had
to consider, not whether Excelsior had been a valid adjudication, and
not whether the requirements for rule-making had been followed, but
whether the requirements for issuing an order in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding had been met in Wyman-Gordon.
Justice Harlan contended that because the order was based on
the invalid Excelsior rule, the first Chenery" decision required a re-
mand.58 There the Court refused to enforce the same order of the
Commission that it later upheld. It did so because the grounds upon
which the order was based were invalid. The Court held that "an
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its
54 In Waring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1941), for example, the court
stated:
Traditionally, he who questioned the law or the best evidence of it is given the
benefit of the new law or the better evidence of it. This is not always the case.
There has arisen, for example, when contract rights or property rights growing
out of contracts are involved, the exception that the one who argued against the
established law is not given the benefit of the change he helped bring about inas-
much as his adversary relied upon the previous law. Such decisions apply the old
law to the case at hand while establishing new law for the future. The Supreme
Court has found no constitutional limitation on state courts proceeding in this
manner. Federal courts have proceeded similarly.
Id. at 645.
55 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 551(7) (1967).
66 394 U.S. at 770.
57 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
68 394 U.S. at 782.
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action can be sustained."" But in Chenery the Commission had not,
prior to the decision, considered any other basis upon which the order
could be upheld. The Court refused to search for such a basis, con-
cluding that this was the proper function of the Commission." The
Supreme Court has since affirmed that Chenery requires only that a
reviewing court not sustain an agency's action on the basis of a
principle which the agency itself might not entertain, the aim being
"not to require the tedious process of administrative adjudication and
judicial review to be needlessly dragged out while the court and agency
engage in a nigh endless game of battledore and shuttlecock with re-
spect to subsidiary findings."" It has also been held, in Phillips v. SEC, 62
that Chenery does not compel a remand when the agency's counsel
urges upon the court an interpretation of the law which the agency
would provide as the basis for its decision, stating that to remand under
such circumstances would be "an exercise in futility."' Thus, where the
court knows with reasonable certainty what grounds the agency will
supply for its action upon remand, it would serve no practical purpose
to remand. The court, however, will not assume such valid grounds.
In Wyman-Gordon the Court upheld the substantive validity of the
disclosure requirement for reasons stated by the Board in its Excelsior
decision. It is reasonable to assume that these same bases would be
cited by the Board on remand.
The Court's refusal to remand, therefore, is not inconsistent with
its interpretation of the APA. The Act allows the Board to make rules
by the rule-making procedures and to issue orders in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. Here the Court simply upheld an order issued in an adjudica-
tory proceeding.
III. AGENCY RULE-MAKING AFTER Wyman-Gordon
Wyman-Gordon should not be interpreted as forcing agencies to
select either rule-making or adjudication in any given case. The Court
in no way interfered with an agency's discretion to choose between the
two processes. Nor did it specify circumstances under which an agency
must choose one or the other. Rather, it clarified what Justice Black
called "the plurality's conception of proper administrative practice.
7,64
This is probably no more than the Court could do under the pro-
visions of the APA since the Act leaves the discretion entirely with the
agencies. Moreover, in Chenery the Court recognized the wisdom of
leaving the agencies in the position of being able to judge on the cir-
cumstances of each case the proper procedure to use.
59 318 U.S. at 95.
69 Id. at 94-95.
61
 Erie-Lackawanna R.R. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 316, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y.),
afi'd sub nona. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
62 388 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1968).
53 Id. at 971.
04 394 U.S. at 770.
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[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative
agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be
solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the
agency may not have had sufficient experience with a partic-
ular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment
into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so special-
ized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture
within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations,
the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a
case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effec-
tive."
Nevertheless, in terms of administrative practice, the Court has pro-
vided the agencies with additional incentive to utilize the APA's long
neglected rule-making procedures.
There appears to be a clear administrative preference for adjudi-
cation. One writer notes three reasons for this: (1) "rules" decided in
adjudicatory proceedings are better able to withstand judicial scru-
tiny; (2) such decisions can be overruled by the agency itself more
easily than the agency can repeal a regulation; (3) they can be made
retroactive in operation." Adjudication, that is, offers more adminis-
trative flexibility than rule-making. However, the Court in Wyman-
Gordon has emphasized the often equally important advantages of the
rule-making process, indicating that agencies should balance these con-
siderations in deciding between rule-making and adjudication.
Engaging in such a balancing process will probably result in more
frequent use of the rule-making procedures by the NLRB. The Board
will have to decide in each case whether to establish a rule of general
applicability and future effect, in which case rule-making would be em-
ployed, or whether to issue an order binding only on the parties and
having the effect of precedent in future cases, in which case the adju-
dicatory process would be used. As the Court noted, a so-called "rule"
established in an adjudicatory proceeding will have no binding effect on
others without a specific direction to the parties in each case. 67 The
Board announced in Excelsior, for example, that in the future an em-
ployer's refusal to furnish the name and address list would be grounds
for setting aside an election." If there had not been a specific direction
to the Wyman-Gordon Company in the present case, however, the Board
would not now be able to invalidate the election despite the Company's
refusal to provide the list. Similarly, the Peerless Plywood rule that em-
ployers and unions are prohibited from making election speeches on
66 332 U.S. at 202-03.
66 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 942-47. See also 1 Davis, Administrative Law, § 105,
37-44 (1958). Contrary to the contention that rules announced in adjudications can better
withstand judicial scrutiny is the case of NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594
(fith Cir. 1960).
67 394 U.S. at 766.
68 156 N.L.R.B. at 1236, 1239-40.
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company time to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours of
an election" should not be binding and should not be grounds for set-
ting aside an election unless the parties are specifically directed by the
Board to refrain from such activity. Thus, in the absence of formal
rules the Board will have to include in each order it issues to particu-
lar parties specific directions as to each requirement it wishes to impose
on the parties. With the number of requirements in each election, this
is likely to prove to be cumbersome. In the interest of simplifying its
procedures the Board may find it desirable to formalize its well-esta-
lished policies by rule-making.
CONCLUSION
The rule-making provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act
are intended to allow all parties likely to be affected by policies estab-
lished by administrative agencies an opportunity to express their views
to the agency on proposed rules. Should the National Labor Relations
Board continue to avoid rule-making procedures entirely, it will fur-
ther limit the participation of interested parties in the formulation of
general labor policy. Recognizing that agency flexibility is often desir-
able, the Court in Wyman-Gordon was wise in not restricting agency
discretion to decide whether to establish a rule or issue an order. Only
after the Board decides that a rule of general applicability and future
effect is necessary must the rule-making procedures be employed. Nev-
ertheless, the Board should begin to utilize the rule-making provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act to give the interested public notice
of proposed policy changes and to afford them the opportunity to be
heard on the proposals. The Wyman-Gordon decision may provide
some impetus for it to do so.
EDWARD R. LEAHY
69 See p. 70 supra.
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